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  Had only a farm program like the new ACRE state revenue program existed instead of the au-
thorized 1996–2008 programs for corn, soybeans, and wheat, farm support expenditures 
would have occurred earlier but totaled less. In contrast, at the higher prices forecast for the 
three crops over the 2009–2012 crop years, spending per acre is expected to be higher for 
acres enrolled in the ACRE program than for acres enrolled in the traditional programs. These 
results reflect the different design features of the two programs: revenue versus price assis-
tance and assistance levels that adjust with lagged market revenue versus fixed nominal sup-
port triggers. The design issues and policy questions raised for both domestic policy consi-
derations and WTO compliance are discussed.
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The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 
(2008 Farm Bill) provides farm commodity pro-
gram participants with the choice of a traditional 
suite of fixed direct payment, marketing loan, and 
price counter-cyclical programs or a new Average 
Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) program suite. 
The ACRE suite, which was authorized for the 
2009–2012 crop years, consists of (i) 80 percent 
of the traditional program’s direct payments, (ii) 
marketing loans at 70 percent of the traditional 
program’s loan rate, and (iii) a new state revenue 
program. Thus, the revenue program replaces the 
counter-cyclical program and substitutes for lower 
direct payments and loan rates. 
  Revenue programs have been discussed for dec-
ades (Harrington and Doering 1993) but ACRE is
the first such program authorized by a farm bill. 
Another policy innovation is that, unlike the mar-
keting loan and counter-cyclical programs which 
have fixed support triggers, ACRE’s revenue risk 
assistance level (the annual trigger for ACRE pay-
ments) adjusts to changes in market revenue over 
time since it is set using moving averages. This 
innovation implies that ACRE does not create a 
floor under revenue. On the other hand, the high 
market revenues since 2006 will translate into a 
high initial ACRE revenue risk assistance level, 
which, everything else constant, increases the like-
lihood of payments from the ACRE revenue pro-
gram compared to the traditional programs. More 
specifically, prices will have to decline by a greater 
proportion before marketing loan and counter-
cyclical payments occur under the 2008 Farm 
Bill.
  U.S. farm programs must meet not only domes-
tic needs but also World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules on agricultural domestic support policies. 
Because ACRE revenue payments are tied to cur-
rent planted acres and market revenue, it is likely 
that the United States will classify them as prod-
uct-specific measures within its Aggregate Mea-
surement of Support (AMS). In contrast, a guiding 
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principle during the as-yet-inconclusive Doha 
Round of negotiations has been to constrain ex-
penditures on policies tied to current production 
and prices, while encouraging movement to pol-
icies decoupled from production decisions and 
market conditions. For example, the current draft 
Doha text implies that permitted U.S. annual sup-
port as notified in its annual Current Total AMS
(CTAMS) would decrease to $7.6 billion (from the 
current ceiling of $19.1 billion) and new product-
specific AMS caps would be imposed (WTO
2008). The ACRE program raises questions re-
garding compliance with these potential U.S. 
WTO commitments. 
  Under the 2008 Farm Bill, farmers and land-
owners have a choice between the traditional 
farm program suite and the ACRE farm program 
suite. For the first year that the ACRE program 
suite was available, preliminary sign-up results in 
2009 indicated that for the three largest-acreage 
eligible crops the shares of corn, soybean, and 
wheat base acres enrolled in ACRE was 15.6 per-
cent, 15.3 percent, and 12.7 percent, respectively 
(USDA 2009a). The sign-up decisions of farmers 
and landowners reflect their weighing of the 
trade-off of reduced direct payments and lower 
loan rates in exchange for eligibility for the reve-
nue risk assistance payments in the context of 
their farm’s situation and their anticipation of 
future market conditions. While not large, the 
initial double-digit sign-up rates for these large-
acreage crops is likely high enough that ACRE or
similar programs will remain part of the debate 
about farm policy in the coming years. For this 
reason, understanding the performance character-
istics of this new program design versus the tradi-
tional programs is important. 
  In this article, we contrast and compare the dif-
ferences in the level and temporal flow of pay-
ments by the ACRE and traditional program suites 
as alternative policy designs for corn, soybeans, 
and wheat. First, we conduct a historical, counter-
factual analysis of the payments that the ACRE
program suite would have made had it existed in 
place of the traditional programs suite during the 
1996–2008 crop years. These counterfactual ACRE
payments are compared with actual payments 
made to farmers during these crop years. Second, 
we forecast payments to corn, soybeans, and 
wheat by the traditional and ACRE suites over the 
2009–2012 crop years. 
  In keeping with our objective to examine the 
performance characteristics of the two farm pro-
gram suites as alternative policy designs, we as-
sume for both the historical and forecast analysis 
that all acres of the three crops are either in the 
traditional suite or in the ACRE suite. Our objec-
tive is not to model the sign-up decisions of pro-
ducers. Actual expenditure on farm programs 
over the 2009–2012 crop years will depend on the 
sign-up decision as well as the cost of each pro-
gram option. Estimates of these expenditures can 
be derived from our results by parametrically 
applying the initial or other assumed future sign-
up rates. 
  The next two sections of this article contain a 
discussion of the policy foundations of the ACRE
program and the ACRE provisions in the 2008 
Farm Bill. Parameters and procedures of the two 
analyses are then presented, followed by a discus-
sion of the results for U.S. support payments and 
their implications under existing and potential 
U.S. WTO commitments. A concluding section 
summarizes and highlights some policy design is-
sues raised by our analysis. 
Current Programs versus ACRE Programs
Current farm programs provide three types of 
support: fixed direct payments, marketing loan 
payments, and counter-cyclical payments. Direct 
payments are a specific dollar amount per histori-
cal base acre. The dollar amount does not change 
with market prices or with the level of produc-
tion, and thus the United States notifies these pay-
ments to the WTO under the Green Box.
1
  The policy objective of the marketing loan and 
counter-cyclical programs is to assist farmers with 
managing the systemic (i.e., market) risk of low 
prices that can last from one year to an extended 
period of years. This objective is implemented 
through fixed marketing loan and counter-cyclical 
support rates. Payments occur if market price drops 
below the support rate, which thus becomes a 
floor on the per unit value of a crop. Marketing 
                                                                                   
1 Expenditures classified in the Green Box are exempt from the Uru-
guay Round limit on CTAMS if a program meets certain criteria de-
fining it to be at most minimally distorting to trade. Expenditures in the 
Blue Box are exempt from the limit on CTAMS because they are 
associated with production-restricting programs. In addition, the de
minimis criteria exempt support for specific commodities and for a sin-
gle non-product-specific category from the CTAMS if it is less than 5 
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loan payments are based on current production 
and prices, and thus are coupled under WTO rules 
and notified as product-specific AMS. Counter-
cyclical payments are based on current prices but 
historical production. The United States currently 
classifies them in its non-product-specific AMS.
  The policy objective of the ACRE revenue pro-
gram is to assist farmers with managing the sys-
temic risk of a decline in crop revenue that can 
extend from one to a short period of years, but to 
avoid creating a floor (Zulauf, Dicks, and Vitale 
2008). Revenue is defined as the product of U.S. 
crop (marketing) year season average cash price 
received by farmers and the state yield per planted 
acre. A state revenue payment becomes available 
for a crop when actual state revenue is less than 
the state’s revenue risk assistance level. Because 
ACRE’s risk assistance level is calculated using 
moving averages of lagged U.S. prices and state 
yields, its risk assistance level increases (de-
creases) over consecutive years as market revenue 
increases (decreases). Thus, no floor exists on rev-
enue. However, ACRE can provide assistance when 
revenue declines but prices remain above the 
fixed marketing loan and counter-cyclical support 
prices.
ACRE Program Provisions
The decision to elect ACRE begins with covered 
crops harvested in 2009 (USDA 2009a, U.S. 
Congress 2008). There are 22 covered crops, in-
cluding barley, corn, upland cotton, oats, peanuts, 
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. ACRE must be 
elected for a farm unit as recorded at the Farm 
Service Agency (an FSA farm); if no choice is 
made, the FSA farm remains in the traditional 
farm program suite. As long as an FSA farm is not 
in  ACRE, the election of ACRE remains open. 
Once ACRE is elected, the FSA farm is enrolled 
through the 2012 crop. ACRE must be elected for 
all covered crops grown on the FSA farm; how-
ever, ACRE payments are crop-specific. 
 An  ACRE revenue payment can occur if a 
state’s actual revenue per planted acre is less than 
the state’s revenue risk assistance level per 
planted acre for a crop for a crop year. 
(1) ACRE revenue risk assistance level
2 per 
                                                                                   
2 Separate revenue risk assistance levels exist for irrigated and non-
irrigated land if at least 25 percent of a state’s planted acres are irri-
gated and at least 25 percent are non-irrigated.
planted acre for state j, crop s, and crop 
year t = {0.90 u [Olympic average yield 
per planted acre for 5 most recent prior 
crop yearsj,s,t] u [average U.S. cash price 
for 2 most recent prior crop yearss,t]}
(2) ACRE actual state revenue per planted 
acre for state j, crop s, and crop year t = 
{[yield per planted acrej,s,t] u [higher of 
U.S. average prices,t or 70 percent of U.S. 
marketing loan rates,t]}. 
ACRE’s revenue risk assistance level cannot in-
crease more than 10 percent from the prior year’s 
level (called a cap) nor can it decrease more than 
10 percent from the prior year’s level (called a 
cup). The 10 percent cup, along with the use of 
historical moving averages, means that ACRE
should provide farmers a longer period of time 
than the market provides to adjust to large, unex-
pected declines in market revenue. But, since 
there is no floor, farmers eventually have to ad-
just to lower market revenue if it persists over 
several years. 
 An  FSA farm eligibility condition also exists. 
Specifically, an FSA farm’s actual revenue must 
be less than the FSA farm’s benchmark revenue 
for the crop. 
(3) ACRE benchmark revenue per planted 
acre for FSA farm i for crop s and crop 
year t = {[Olympic average of FSA farm’s 
planted yield for 5 most recent prior crop 
yearsi,s,t] u [average U.S. cash price for 2 
most recent prior crop yearss,t] + [FSA
farm’s per acre insurance premiumi,s,t]}
(4)  Actual revenue per planted acre for FSA
farm i for crop s and crop year t = {[FSA
farm’s yield per planted acrei,s,t] u [U.S. 
average prices,t]}. 
 An  ACRE revenue payment is made to an FSA
farm for an eligible crop when both the state pay-
ment condition is met and the FSA farm eligibility 
condition is met. A state’s ACRE revenue pay-
ment per planted acre is capped at 25 percent of 
the state’s risk assistance level. 
(5) ACRE revenue payment for eligible FSA
farm i in state j for crop s and crop year    520   October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
t = {[83.3 percent of FSA farm’s planted 
acresi,s,t (becomes 85 percent for 2012 
crop)]  u [lesser of (ACRE state revenue 
risk assistance level per planted acrej,s,t
minus state actual revenue per planted 
acrej,s,t) or (25 percent of ACRE state rev-
enue risk assistance level per planted 
acrej,s,t)] u [(FSA farm’s Olympic average 
yield for 5 most recent prior crop yearsi,s,t)
/ (state’s Olympic average yield for 5 
most recent prior crop yearsj,s,t)]}. 
While  ACRE revenue payments to an FSA farm 
depend on the acres planted to each eligible crop, 
an FSA farm cannot receive ACRE revenue pay-
ments on more acres than the FSA farm’s total 
base acres. For most eligible crops, planted acres 
align with the conventional definition. However, 
for barley, corn, oats, sorghum, and wheat, FSA
defined planted acres as harvested acres plus 
acres reported as failed acres to FSA. Failed acres 
are acres that were intended for harvest but were 
not actually harvested. 
  For each payment entity, ACRE fixed direct 
payments cannot exceed $32,000, or 20 percent 
less than the $40,000 limit for traditional program 
direct payments. For each payment entity, ACRE
state revenue payments cannot exceed $65,000, 
the limit on counter-cyclical payments, plus the 
amount equal to the payment entity’s 20 percent 
reduction in direct payments. The 2008 Farm Bill 
removed payment limits on the marketing loan 
program. 
Analytical Procedures
The historical, counterfactual analysis was con-
ducted beginning with the 1996 crop year. The 
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform 
Act of 1996 (1996 Farm Bill) eliminated annual 
land set-asides; gave farmers additional flexibility 
to make planting decisions, except for restrictions 
on planting fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on 
base acreage; eliminated most public stocks pro-
grams; and instituted fixed income payments 
(Nelson and Schertz 1996). These changes subs-
tantively altered the structure of farm support 
programs and had implications for their impact on 
production decisions and market prices (Orden, 
Paarlberg, and Roe 1999, Schertz and Doering 
1999). Thus, the 1996 and later crop years are 
more representative of current crop production 
incentives and market conditions than years prior 
to 1996. The historical, counterfactual analytical 
period ended with the 2008 crop year, the latest 
year for which information was available on final 
prices, yields, and acres, and the last year for 
which ACRE was not available as a support op-
tion. 
 Direct  income,  marketing  loan,
3 counter-cyc-
lical, market loss, and oilseed programs made 
payments to corn, soybeans, and wheat over the 
1996–2008 crop years (USDA 2009b). The direct 
income payment and marketing loan programs 
were included in the 1996 and subsequent farm 
bills. In response to large declines in farm prices 
and incomes, Congress instituted on an ad hoc
basis market loss payments for corn and wheat 
for the 1998–2001 crop years and oilseed pay-
ments for soybeans for the 1999 and 2000 crop 
years. These programs became the counter-cycli-
cal program in the Farm Security and Rural In-
vestment Act of 2002 (USDA 2008). 
  For the counterfactual analysis, ACRE state
revenue payments were calculated for corn for 
grain,
4 soybeans, and wheat using observed U.S. 
crop year cash prices, state production, state 
planted acres for soybeans, and state harvested 
acres plus state FSA failed acres for corn for grain 
and wheat.
5 Information was available for states 
that accounted for over 99 percent of U.S. corn, 
soybean, and wheat production (USDA 2009d). 
Data started with the 1991 crop year in order to 
construct the 5-year Olympic moving average of 
state yields for 1996. We contrast the estimated 
counterfactual payments assuming all corn for 
grain, soybean, and wheat acres were enrolled in 
the ACRE program with the actual payments made 
by the traditional programs during the 1996–2008 
crop years. 
                                                                                   
3 Loan deficiency and market loan loss payments compose marketing 
loan payments.
4 Corn harvested as silage is eligible for farm programs and thus for 
election into ACRE. However, to simplify the calculations, the analysis 
was conducted only for corn harvested for grain. Over the 1996–2008 
crop years, harvested plus failed corn silage acres averaged 6.1 million 
acres, while harvested plus failed corn for grain acres averaged 71.9 
million acres. Corn for silage acres averaged 7.8 percent of all corn 
acres over the 1996–2008 crop years.
5 Failed acres were obtained from the Farm Service Agency. The first 
available crop year was 1995. For the 1991–1994 crop years, failed 
acres were estimated for state s and year t using the following linear re-
gression and the data available for the 1995–2008 crop years: Failed 
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  The second part of our analysis is a forecast 
comparison for the 2009–2012 crop years. As 
with the counterfactual analysis, the primary ob-
jective is to compare payments for the traditional 
suite of farm programs and the ACRE suite of 
farm programs assuming only one suite or the 
other is available. The forecast analysis is cen-
tered on the USDA forecasts of national U.S. 
acres, prices, and yields for the 2009–2012 crops 
(USDA 2009c). Payments are estimated for both 
the traditional suite of programs and the ACRE
suite of programs. 
  In our analysis, U.S. yield per planted acre for
soybeans for crop year t was calculated as [(fore-
cast U.S. productiont) / forecast U.S. planted 
acrest)]. For corn and wheat, U.S. yield per 
planted acre for crop year t was calculated as 
{[forecast U.S. productiont] / [forecast U.S. har-
vested acrest u (U.S. failed plus harvested acres 
in 2004–2008 / U.S. harvested acres in 2004–
2008)]}. The U.S. forecasts for acres, prices, and 
yields for crop year t were turned into forecasts 
for individual states as follows: {U.S. forecast 
acrest (or pricest or yieldst) u [(average state 
acres (or price or yield) for 2004–2008) / 
(average U.S. acres (or price or yield) for 2004–
2008)]}. These forecasts are the baseline values 
for each crop year. The forecast U.S. prices, state 
acres, and state yields are used to estimate ACRE
state revenue payments. The forecast U.S. prices 
and forecast state prices are used to estimate 
counter-cyclical and marketing loan payments, 
respectively.
  For the 2009 crop year, the ACRE state revenue 
risk assistance levels announced by the FSA (USDA 
2009a) are used. The risk assistance levels are 
then updated for the 2010 through 2012 crop 
years, using the USDA forecast of U.S. price and 
the state yield forecasts derived from the USDA 
forecasts of U.S. yield. 
  Figure 1 presents the U.S. average crop year 
prices of corn, soybean, and wheat for the 1991–
2008 crop years as well as the prices forecast by 
USDA for the 2009–2012 crop years. Also shown 
in Figure 1 is the gross revenue per acre obtained 
by multiplying the U.S. average crop year price 
by the U.S. average yield per planted acre for
each crop. Over the 2009–2012 forecast period, 
there is a slight downward trend in corn price and 
revenue. After a one-year decline from 2008 to 
2009, soybean and wheat prices and revenue 
decline slightly or are stable. Thus, the USDA 
forecasts reflect a continuation of the increased 
levels of prices and revenue that occurred during 
2007 and 2008. However, prices and revenue are 
unlikely to remain as smooth as forecast by USDA. 
  We incorporate this uncertainty about prices 
and revenue for 2009–2102 into our analysis as 
follows. Percentage deviations of state planted 
acres, state yield per planted acre, and U.S. crop 
year price are calculated for each crop year from 
1996 through 2006 relative to the moving average 
for the prior five years (e.g., the difference of the 
U.S. average price for crop year t from the aver-
age of the U.S. prices for crop years t –1 to t – 5 
is expressed as a percentage, and likewise for 
yields and acreage). These calculations result in 
11 sets of percentage deviations which are ap-
plied to the USDA forecast of U.S. prices and the 
forecasts derived for state acres and yields for 
each crop year from 2009 through 2012. ACRE
state revenue payments, as well as marketing loan 
and counter-cyclical payments, are estimated for 
each set of percentage deviations. 
  The averages of the 11 estimates of payments 
are the forecasted mean expenditures on the farm 
program for the given crop year in our analysis, 
assuming the benchmark USDA forecasts for the 
crop year, the historically observed percentage 
deviations for crop years 1996 through 2006, and 
that all acreage is enrolled in the specific pro-
gram. The mean values of our forecast prices and 
revenue remain essentially at the levels of the 
USDA forecasts, but our estimates of the average 
level of farm support reflect the variability that 
would result from the applied sets of percentage 
deviations around the initial forecasts. 
  The percentage deviations for the 2007 and 
2008 crop years are not included in the sets of 
deviations affecting the forecasts. The prices of 
corn, soybeans, and wheat were substantially 
higher during these two crop years than during 
the 1996–2006 period (Figure 1). Including the 
large percentage increase in prices for the 2007 
and 2008 crop years would have increased the 
average percentage deviation (taking upward and 
downward price movements into account) of U.S. 
price from the one to two percent range for the 
1996–2006 period to the nine to twelve percent 
range for the 1996–2008 period. Thus, including 
the percentage increases for 2007 and 2008 
would have resulted in a mean price forecast 













































Panel B:  Revenue per Planted Acre
Forecast
Figure 1. Price and Revenue per Planted Acre for Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat (U.S., 1991–2012 
crop years) 
Notes: For soybeans, planted acres are the conventional definition. However, for corn and wheat, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Farm Service Agency (FSA) defined planted acres as harvested acres plus acres reported as failed acres to FSA. 
Failed acres are acres that were intended for harvest but were not actually harvested. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA 2009d) and authors’ original estimates.
have exceeded the USDA price forecast for the 
crop year. 
  The historical and forecast analyses do not in-
clude three constraints on ACRE state revenue 
payments: (i) the ACRE payment limit per legal 
entity, (ii) the ACRE FSA farm eligibility condi-
tion, and (iii) the restriction that an FSA farm can-
not receive ACRE revenue payments on more 
planted acres than the FSA farm’s total base acres. 
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of the lack of farm-level data needed to parame-
terize them. As a result, the analysis provides an 
upper-bound estimate on ACRE revenue payments 
for corn for grain, soybeans, and wheat. 
Results
Counterfactual Historical Analysis 
Had only the ACRE farm program suite been 
available for corn, soybeans, and wheat instead of 
the traditional program suite over the 1996–2008 
crop years, total expenditures would have been 44 
percent lower for the ACRE suite (Table 1). ACRE
made $10 billion less in fixed direct payments, 
reflecting the 20 percent reduction. ACRE’s 30 
percent lower loan rates were estimated to elimi-
nate all marketing loan payments, as the market 
prices observed for all crops, years, and states 
were above the ACRE marketing loan rates. In 
contrast, payments by the authorized marketing 
loan program totaled $27.7 billion to corn, soy-
beans, and wheat. ACRE state revenue payments 
were estimated to total $14.6 billion for the three 
crops combined, 69 percent less than the $47.8 
billion in combined marketing loan, market loss, 
oilseed, and counter-cyclical payments actually 
made. By crop, total ACRE program payments 
(including fixed direct payments) were estimated 
to be 51 percent, 38 percent, and 32 percent less 
for corn, soybeans, and wheat, respectively, than 
total farm program payments actually made for 
the 1996–2008 crop years. Figure 2 presents the 
total annual payments by the farm programs au-
thorized by Congress and the estimated annual 
payments that would have been made by the 
ACRE program suite. 
  A concern has been raised that ACRE can result 
in large government expenditures if a sharp de-
cline in price occurs. Such an event occurred dur-
ing the mid- to late 1990s (Figure 1). From the 
peak annual price to the low annual price, de-
clines totaled 44 percent for corn (1995–1999), 
40 percent for soybeans (1996–2001), and 45 per-
cent for wheat (1995–1999). U.S. season average 
price declined by over 20 percent from the pre-
vious year’s season average price in 1997 (wheat) 
and 1998 (corn, soybeans, and wheat). In addi-
tion, annual price declines of at least 10 percent 
occurred in 1996 (corn) and 1997 (corn, soy-
beans). These price declines were caused by an 
increase in production, due in part to an increase 
in corn and wheat yields from the below trendline 
yields of 1995 and in part to the elimination of 
annual acreage set-asides and increased planting 
flexibility authorized by the 1996 Farm Bill. In 
addition, demand was adversely affected by the 
Asian financial crisis that emerged during the fall 
of 1997. 
  For the 1996 through 1998 crop years, the 
counterfactual ACRE state revenue payments were 
estimated to total $3.2 billion for corn, $2.3 bil-
lion for soybeans, and $2.0 billion for wheat, as 
shown in the annual expenditures in Figure 3. In 
comparison, marketing loan payments, the only 
price program authorized by the 1996 Farm Bill, 
totaled $1.5 billion for corn, $1.2 billion for soy-
beans, and $0.5 billion for wheat. Across all three 
crops, estimated ACRE state revenue payments 
were 2.3 times higher than actual marketing loan 
payments during the 1996–1998 crop years. ACRE
state revenue payments were larger because ACRE
uses a two-year moving average of prices in de-
termining its state revenue risk assistance level 
and because U.S. crop year prices during the 1995, 
1996, and 1997 crop years were much higher than 
the loan rates fixed in the 1996 Farm Bill. Hence, 
prices had to decline further to trigger marketing 
loan payments than they did to trigger ACRE state
revenue payments. 
  The limited risk assistance provided by the 
marketing loan program was a key reason that 
Congress authorized market loss payments begin-
ning with the 1998 crop for corn and wheat and 
oilseed payments beginning with the 1999 crop 
for soybeans
6. Market loss payments continued 
for corn and wheat through the 2001 crop, while 
oilseed payments for soybeans ended with the 
2000 crop. Over the entire 1996 through 2001 
crop year period, estimated ACRE state revenue 
payments to corn, soybeans, and wheat totaled 
                                                                                   
6 The counter-cyclical program did not exist until the 2002 crop year. 
To provide perspective on what counter-cyclical payments might have 
been during the 1996–2001 crop years, a counterfactual analysis was 
conducted. Counter-cyclical program parameters for the 2002 crop 
year (base acres, base yield, target prices, and loan rates) were assumed 
for the earlier crop years. No counter-cyclical payments were estimated 
for the 1996 and 1997 crop years. However, maximum counter-cyclical 
payments were estimated for corn, soybeans, and wheat for each of the 
1998–2001 crop years because, for these years, the U.S. crop year 
average cash price was below the U.S. loan rate. In total for 1998–
2001, estimated counter-cyclical payments exceeded actual market loss 
(oilseed) payments: $11.6 versus $8.6 billion for corn, $2.2 versus $1.3 
billion for soybeans, and $5.1 versus $4.9 billion for wheat.524   October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
Table 1. Total Payments by the ACRE Farm Program Suite and the Traditional Farm Program 
Suite for Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat (U.S., 1996–2012 crop years) 
Billion $ 
Farm Program  Corn  Soybeans  Wheat  Total 
PANEL A: TOTALS FOR 1996–2008 CROP YEARS     
Traditional suite of programs (actual payments) 
 Direct  payments  $29.2  $4.1 $16.6 $49.9 
  Marketing  loan  $15.2 $9.9 $2.6  $27.7 
  Counter-cyclical/market  loss/oilseed  $13.9 $1.3 $4.9  $20.1 
  Total  $58.3 $15.3 $24.1 $97.7 
      
ACRE suite of programs (counterfactual estimates) 
 Direct  payments  $23.3  $3.3 $13.3 $39.9 
  Marketing  loan  $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
  State  revenue  $5.3 $6.2 $3.1  $14.6 
  Total  $28.6  $9.5 $16.4 $54.5 
PANEL B: TOTALS FOR 2009–2012 CROP YEARS     
Traditional suite of programs 
 Direct  payments  $8.1 $2.3 $4.3  $14.7 
  Marketing  loan  $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
  Counter-cyclical  $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
  Total  $8.1 $2.3 $4.3  $14.7 
      
ACRE suite of programs 
 Direct  payments  $6.5 $1.8 $3.5  $11.8 
  Marketing  loan  $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 
  State  revenue  $5.4 $5.8 $2.3  $13.5 
  Total  $11.9 $7.6 $5.8  $25.3 
Sources: Payments by the traditional suite of farm programs for crop years 1996–2008 are actual payments reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (USDA 2009b). Payments by the ACRE suite of farm programs for all crop 
years and by the traditional suite of farm programs for crop years 2009–2012 are authors’ original estimates. 
$13.7 billion, less than the $14.8 billion in com-
bined market loss and oilseed payments and less 
than the $19.5 billion in combined marketing loan 
payments. 
  Thus there are differences in the timing and the 
total level of payments between a counterfactual 
ACRE program suite and the traditional programs 
during 1996–2001. Over the 1996–2001 crop years, 
55 percent of estimated ACRE state revenue pay-
ments occurred during the 1996–1998 crop years. 
ACRE revenue payments began to decline in the 
1999 or 2000 crop year as its state risk assistance 
levels began to decline to reflect the decline in 
market revenue that was occurring. In contrast, 
over the 1996–2001 crop years, 55 percent of mar-
keting loan, market loss, and oilseed payments 
occurred during the 2000 and 2001 crop years. 
  One other notable policy event during the 
historical analysis period was the $12.9 billion in 
marketing loan and counter-cyclical payments 
made to corn during the 2004 and 2005 crop 
years. These payments accounted for 44 percent 
of all marketing loan, counter-cyclical, and mar-
ket loss payments to corn over the 1996–2008 
crop years. In contrast, estimated counterfactual 
ACRE state revenue payments for corn totaled 
only $0.4 billion for the 2004 and 2005 crop 
years. The reason for the low ACRE payments 
was high yields during these years. For the United 
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(cont’d.)
Figure 2. Annual Total Payments by the ACRE Farm Program Suite and the Traditional Farm 
Program Suite for Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat (U.S., 1996–2012 crop years) 
Sources: Payments by the traditional suite of farm programs for crop years 1996–2008 are actual payments reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (USDA 2009b). Payments by the ACRE suite of farm programs for all crop years 
and by the traditional suite of farm programs for crop years 2009–2012 are authors’ original estimates. 
per planted acre in 2004 and a relatively high 148 
bushels in 2005. Because ACRE is a revenue pro-
gram, yields are incorporated into its calculation 
of assistance payments. In short, this policy event 
illustrates the important role that yield deviations 
play in determining payments from the ACRE
revenue program. 
Forecast Analysis 
Prices forecast by USDA for crop years 2009–
2012 are substantially above the loan rates and 
target prices specified in the 2008 Farm Bill for 
corn, soybeans, and wheat. The average value of 
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Figure 2 (cont’d.). Annual Total Payments by the ACRE Farm Program Suite and the 
Traditional Farm Program Suite for Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat (U.S., 1996–2012 crop years) 
Sources: Payments by the traditional suite of farm programs for crop years 1996–2008 are actual payments reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (USDA 2009b). Payments by the ACRE suite of farm programs for all crop years 
and by the traditional suite of farm programs for crop years 2009–2012 are authors’ original estimates.
price used in the forecast analysis was -0.9 
percent for corn, +1.7 percent for soybeans, and 
+1.5 percent for wheat. However, percentage de-
clines in price were as high as 28 percent for 
corn, 25 percent for soybeans, and 32 percent for 
wheat. Given these data parameters, forecast pay-
ments by the traditional marketing loan program 
were essentially zero in all cases. Market loan 
payments were forecast only for wheat during the 
2010–2012 crop years. The largest average amount 
was $160,000 in 2012. Counter-cyclical payments 
were forecast only for wheat during the 2012 crop 
year. The average amount over the 11 sets of 
deviations was $5.5 million. Thus, assuming that 
all corn, soybean, and wheat acres were enrolled 
in the traditional farm program suite, almost all of 
the $14.7 billion dollars in payments forecast for 
this suite were direct income payments (Table 1). 
The reason that small marketing loan payments 
were estimated, even when counter-cyclical pay-
ments were estimated to be near zero, is because 
price can be less than the loan rate for brief peri-
ods, usually at harvest. 
  The total average forecast values for ACRE rev-
enue payments encompass the outcomes resulting 
under the 11 sets of percentage deviations applied 
in our analysis (Table 1). The average and maxi-
mum annual payments resulting from these sets of 
percentage deviations are presented in Table 2 for 
each crop year and crop. The maximum values 
greatly exceed the average values because many 
of the sets of deviations resulted in zero or mi-
nimal payments. 
 Payments  from  the  ACRE program suite were 
forecast to average a total of $25.3 billion under 
the applied sets of deviations and assuming that 
all corn, soybean, and wheat acres were enrolled 
in ACRE. The ACRE program suite is forecast to 
make more payments on average than the tradi-
tional program suite for every crop over the 
2009–2012 crop years, as ACRE state revenue 
payments exceed the 20 percent reduction in 
direct payments. 
  The forecast average of ACRE revenue pay-
ments changes little for corn over the 2009–2012 
crop years, but declines by approximately 50 per-
cent for soybeans and wheat between the 2009 
and 2011 crop years (Table 2 and Figure 3). These 
different time paths of forecast average ACRE











































Figure 3. Annual Payments by the ACRE State Revenue Program and by the Traditional Price-
Based Programs for Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat (U.S., 1996–2012 crop years) 
Notes: The traditional price-based programs include the counter-cyclical, marketing loan, market loss, and oilseed programs. Con-
gress instituted on an ad hoc basis market loss payments for corn and wheat for the 1998–2001 crop years and oilseed payments 
for soybeans for the 1999 and 2000 crop years. These programs became the counter-cyclical program in the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002.
Sources: Payments by the traditional price-based programs for crop years 1996–2008 are actual payments reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (USDA 2009b). ACRE state revenue payments for all crop years and payments 
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Figure 3 (cont’d.). Annual Payments by the ACRE State Revenue Program and by the 
Traditional Price-Based Programs for Corn, Soybeans, and Wheat (U.S., 1996–2012 crop years) 
Notes: The traditional price-based programs include the counter-cyclical, marketing loan, market loss, and oilseed programs. Con-
gress instituted on an ad hoc basis market loss payments for corn and wheat for the 1998–2001 crop years and oilseed payments 
for soybeans for the 1999 and 2000 crop years. These programs became the counter-cyclical program in the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act of 2002.
Sources: Payments by the traditional price-based programs for crop years 1996–2008 are actual payments reported by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Farm Service Agency (USDA 2009b). ACRE state revenue payments for all crop years and payments 
by the traditional price-based programs for crop years 2009–2012 are the authors’ original estimates. 
of USDA revenue forecasts and the use of mov-
ing averages to calculate the ACRE state revenue 
assistance level.
7 Corn revenue per acre is basi-
cally flat over the 2007–2012 crop years (Figure 
1). Soybean and wheat revenue per acre declines
from 2008 to 2009, then remains basically flat. A 
flat revenue time path reflects the offsetting 
impacts of a slight decline in price and a trendline 
increase in yields. 
                                                                                   
7 Subsequent to our forecast analysis, using information contained in 
the USDA Production and World Supply and Demand Estimates re-
ports released in January 2010 and assuming the announced parameters 
for the 2009 crop year ACRE state revenue program and that all acres 
were enrolled in the ACRE program, ACRE revenue payments were 
estimated at $0.055 billion for corn, $0.002 billion for soybeans, and 
$1.396 billion for wheat, instead of the average values shown in Table 
2 that sum to $4.29 billion. Although this updated information suggests 
that ACRE state revenue payments may be below the forecast average 
payments for the 2009 crop year, we retain the 2009 forecasts in our 
analysis as part of the illustration of the design features of the ACRE 
program suite. 
  The forecasts for the 2009–2012 crop years 
assume that all acres are enrolled either in the tra-
ditional farm program suite or in the ACRE pro-
gram suite. Actual expenditures on farm pro-
grams will depend not only on the cost of each 
program option but also on which program option 
is elected by farmers and landowners. For exam-
ple, applying the preliminary ACRE sign-up rates 
(15.6 percent for corn, 15.3 percent for soybeans, 
and 12.7 percent for wheat) results in a forecasted 
average expenditure on the ACRE state revenue 
program for the 2009 crop year of $640 million 
instead of the $4.3 billion (Table 2) forecast as-
suming all acreage was enrolled. While the distri-
bution of participation shares in future years is 
unknown, these shares are an important deter-
minant of how much the United States may spend 
on farm programs. Zulauf and Orden The Revenue Program Option in the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill 529
Table 2. Forecast Payments by Year by the ACRE State Revenue Program for Corn, Soybeans, 
and Wheat, and Comparison with Product-Specific Caps Proposed in the Doha Round of World 
Trade Organization Negotiations (U.S., 2009–2012 crop years) 
Billion $ 
Crop  2009 2010 2011 2012 
Corn
Average revenue payments  $1.40 $1.25 $1.35 $1.37 
Maximum revenue payments over forecast cases  $6.05  $5.64  $5.89  $5.99 
Number of forecast cases exceeding proposed 
Doha WTO product-specific cap 
3 3 3 3 
      
Soybeans
Average revenue payments  $2.10 $1.64 $1.03 $1.03 
Maximum revenue payments over forecast cases  $6.25  $5.43  $3.89  $3.92 
Number of forecast cases exceeding proposed 
Doha WTO product-specific cap 
4 4 4 4 
      
Wheat  
Average revenue payments  $0.79 $0.66 $0.41 $0.44 
Maximum revenue payments over forecast cases  $1.93  $1.71  $1.15  $1.23 
Number of forecast cases exceeding proposed 
Doha WTO product-specific cap 
7 7 5 5 
      
Total average revenue payments  $4.29 $3.56 $2.78 $2.84 
Note: Total number of forecast cases is 11. 
Source: Authors’ original estimates. 
ACRE in World Trade Organization (WTO)
Context
The ACRE state revenue program is prima facie
coupled to current planting decisions and prices 
of specific crops. Thus, ACRE state revenue pay-
ments likely will be notified to WTO as product-
specific AMS expenditures, and the level of pay-
ments will affect assessments of U.S. WTO com-
pliance. Another consideration is whether the ex-
isting Uruguay Round WTO compliance rules re-
main in effect or are replaced by a new Doha 
Round agreement. 
  The United States has notified the WTO that it 
has been under its Uruguay Round Current Total 
AMS commitment of $19.1 billion for the 1995–
2007 crop (marketing) years. The peak counter-
factual estimated total annual ACRE revenue pay-
ment for corn, soybeans, and wheat over these 
years was $5.2 billion for the 1998 crop year. 
While this amount exceeds the $3.3 billion in 
AMS actually notified for corn, soybeans, and 
wheat, the notified CTAMS for 1998 was only 
$10.5 billion. The U.S. CTAMS is highest for 
1999 and 2000, at $16.8 billion. However, esti-
mated  ACRE revenue payments for corn, soy-
beans, and wheat were less than the notified AMS
for these crops: $4.2 versus $6.4 billion in the 
1999 crop year, and $1.5 versus $7.2 billion in 
the 2000 crop year. Thus, the United States likely 
would have remained compliant with its Uruguay 
Round CTAMS commitment if the ACRE program 
suite instead of the authorized programs had 
existed over the 1996–2007 crop years. 
  Whether the United States would exceed its 
Uruguay Round commitment in the 2009–2012 
crop years will depend on the amount of pay-
ments from the ACRE revenue program plus the 
other notified support. For 2007, the latest year 
for which information is available, the United 
States notified $6.3 billion in AMS market price 
support for dairy and sugar in its CTAMS and 530   October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
only $7.4 million in marketing loan payments be-
cause of the relatively high prices (Blandford and 
Josling 2009). The sum of the highest forecast 
ACRE revenue payments to corn, soybeans, and 
wheat combined for a set of applied deviations 
for a crop year is $14.2 billion. Thus, it seems 
possible that the United States could exceed its 
current WTO CTAMS cap of $19.1 billion in a 
large ACRE revenue payment year. Nevertheless, 
under the average forecast level of ACRE revenue
payments for corn, soybeans, and wheat, the 
United States would remain well below its exist-
ing commitment. In addition, changes in the 2008 
Farm Bill may lower notifications for dairy by as 
much as $3.8 billion, creating additional CTAMS
latitude in future notifications (Blandford and 
Orden 2008). 
  The draft Doha rules would, if agreed upon, 
impose tighter constraints on U.S. farm support 
programs. The U.S. CTAMS commitment would 
decline to $7.6 billion over a five-year phase-in 
period (WTO 2008). A new cap on Overall Trade 
Distorting Support (OTDS) would constrain the 
sum of CTAMS, product-specific, and non–prod-
uct-specific de minimis support, and a redefined 
Blue Box support that would include counter-
cyclical payments. The OTDS cap initially would 
be $32.3 billion, declining to $14.4 billion over 
five years. New product-specific AMS caps would 
be set immediately upon implementation of the 
agreement. For U.S. corn, soybeans, and wheat, 
the annual caps have been calculated to be $1.11, 
$1.12, and $0.23 billion, respectively, under the 
proposed rules (Blandford and Orden 2008). 
  In terms of the Doha OTDS and AMS commit-
ments, the forecasts of large ACRE revenue ex-
penditures under some sets of the percentage de-
viations result in the United States exceeding its 
eventual commitments if all corn, soybean, and 
wheat acreage is enrolled. However, we will fo-
cus the remaining discussion of the proposed 
Doha rules on the product-specific AMS caps be-
cause they are the most directly comparable to the 
results generated by our analysis. 
  Because of the higher prices forecast for 2009–
2012, it is unlikely that the product-specific AMS
caps for corn, soybeans, and wheat are likely to 
be a binding WTO compliance consideration for 
the traditional suite of farm programs at the loan 
rates and target prices enacted in the 2008 Farm 
Bill. However, the proposed product-specific AMS
caps are a potential constraint given the forecast 
ACRE state revenue payments and assuming that 
all acres are enrolled in the ACRE program. The 
forecast average ACRE revenue payments for corn 
for each year from 2009 through 2012 are just 
over corn’s $1.11 billion AMS cap (Table 2). 
Forecast average ACRE revenue payments exceed 
soybeans’ $1.12 billion AMS cap in 2009 and 
2010 and wheat’s $0.23 billion cap in each year. 
The forecast averages reflect several cases of the 
applied percentage deviations that result in ACRE
revenue payments much higher than the forecast 
averages. For corn and soybeans, the forecast 
payments exceed the Doha caps for each crop 
year in 3 and 4 of the 11 cases, respectively. For 
wheat, forecast payments exceed the Doha prod-
uct-specific AMS cap for as many as 7 of the 11 
cases for a crop year. Of course, the participation 
rate in ACRE will also affect this assessment. For 
example, if the share of base acres that signed up 
for the ACRE program suite in 2009 remains the 
same through 2012, total AMS expenditures on 
both suites of programs would remain below the 
Doha product-specific caps for corn and soybeans 
for all cases and years and in all but one case and 
crop year for wheat. 
Summary and Discussion of Policy Issues 
Raised by ACRE
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 
provides farm commodity program participants 
with the choice of a traditional suite of fixed di-
rect payment, marketing loan, and price counter-
cyclical programs or a new Average Crop Reve-
nue Election (ACRE) suite of programs. The ACRE
suite, which was authorized for the 2009–2012 
crop years, consists of (i) 80 percent of the tradi-
tional program’s direct payments, (ii) marketing 
loans at 70 percent of the traditional program’s 
loan rate, and (iii) a new state revenue program. 
ACRE is the first revenue program authorized by a 
farm bill, and, unlike the fixed nominal support 
triggers of traditional commodity programs, has 
no floor on its annual revenue risk assistance 
levels that trigger payment eligibility. 
  A historical, counterfactual analysis provided 
estimates of payments that the ACRE suite of pro-
grams would have made had it existed instead of 
the traditional programs during the 1996–2008 
crop years, assuming that all acres planted to Zulauf and Orden The Revenue Program Option in the 2008 U.S. Farm Bill 531
corn, soybeans, and wheat were enrolled. Also, 
payments were forecast for both farm program 
suites over the 2009–2012 crop years. As with the 
historical analysis, payments were forecast as-
suming all acres of corn, soybeans, and wheat 
were in either the traditional farm program suite 
or in the ACRE farm program suite. Although the 
2008 Farm Bill allows farm program participants 
to choose between the two suites, the stark con-
trast that results from assuming that all acres are 
in one program suite at a time allows us to focus 
the analysis on the key policy design questions 
raised by the ACRE state revenue program. 
  One design question concerns the use of mov-
ing-average, market-based assistance levels ver-
sus fixed nominal assistance levels to trigger sup-
port.  ACRE’s use of moving averages of prices 
and yields eliminates a floor under revenue. In 
contrast, the fixed marketing loan and counter-
cyclical support rates provide a floor under prices 
received by farmers. These contrasting design 
features are a key reason that the estimated coun-
terfactual  ACRE state revenue payments were 
greater than the actual marketing loan payments 
authorized by Congress over the 1996–1998 crop 
years, yet lower than the marketing loan pay-
ments (and also the marketing loan plus market 
loss and oilseed payments) over the 1996–2001 
crop years. In addition, ACRE’s use of moving 
averages of prices and yields allows its risk as-
sistance level to increase as market revenue in-
creases, in contrast to the fixed marketing loan 
and counter-cyclical support rates that remain 
constant unless they are changed by an act of 
Congress. These contrasting design features, in 
combination with the higher prices and revenue 
forecast for the 2009–2012 crop years, are key 
reasons that under the 2008 Farm Bill the ACRE
revenue payments for enrolled acres are forecast 
to exceed marketing loan and counter-cyclical 
payments for corn, soybeans, and wheat. The dif-
ferent results between the historical, counterfac-
tual analysis and the forecast analysis show how 
the relative timing, persistence, and likelihood of 
payments under the fixed support versus market 
flexible support depends on the balance between 
supply and demand and the resulting path of 
prices and revenue over time. 
  A second design issue concerns price versus 
revenue protection. ACRE revenue payments can 
occur when revenue declines, whether the cause 
is a decline in price, a decline in yield, or both. In 
contrast, price support programs provide pay-
ments, when prices are below the support rate 
even if revenue is average or above average. Such 
a situation occurred during the 2004 and 2005 
crop years when marketing loan and counter-cyc-
lical payments to corn totaled $12.9 billion. In 
contrast, only $0.4 billion in counterfactual ACRE
revenue payments to corn were estimated, as 
record or high yields offset most of the impact of 
low prices. In short, revenue programs provide a 
different match than price programs with the inci-
dence of risk. 
  The different match with the incidence of risk 
reflects the different designs of the ACRE revenue
program and the traditional price-based programs, 
which in turn stems from their different policy 
objectives. The policy objective of the marketing 
loan program and counter-cyclical program is to 
assist farmers with managing the systemic risk of 
low prices that can last from one year to an ex-
tended period of years by providing a price floor. 
The policy objective of the ACRE revenue pro-
gram is to assist farmers with managing the sys-
temic risk of a decline in a crop’s revenue that 
can extend from one year to a short period of 
years, irrespective of the level of revenue at 
which the decline occurs, but to avoid creating a 
floor. While it is clear that the relative importance 
of these risks depends on the balance between 
supply and demand, it is not clear whether far-
mers and policymakers prefer the match with the 
incidence of risk provided by the ACRE revenue
program or the match with the incidence of risk 
provided by the traditional price support pro-
grams. 
  An important political economy question of 
sustainability arises with any policy instrument 
whose assistance level is tied to the market. Spe-
cifically, if only an ACRE revenue program were 
available, would Congress step in to increase 
payments in response to the decline in revenue 
payments that would occur during a period of 
extended low revenue? This question can be 
framed further by examining the period of de-
clining and low prices of the mid- to late 1990s 
when Congress stepped in to create the market 
loss program in 1998 and the oilseed program in 
1999. Over the 1996–1998 crop years, combined 
counterfactual  ACRE payments for corn, soy-
beans, and wheat were estimated at $7.5 billion. 
Actual marketing loan payments were $3.2 bil-
lion. If the ACRE program had existed instead of 532   October 2010  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
the 1996 Farm Bill program, would the larger 
payments have precluded Congress from increas-
ing support in 1998? The following year, ACRE
payments would have declined. Would Congress 
have stepped in at that point, negating the need 
for farmers to adjust over time to a lower revenue 
level under an ACRE program suite? Or could the 
political economy of farm support programs evolve 
to the point where revenue assistance during an 
initial decline without further intervention in a 
continuing period of low revenue becomes an ac-
ceptable outcome? Because it is unknown what 
future economic events will be, these questions 
are relevant to future deliberations over alterna-
tive farm policy options. 
  The policy design question of fixed versus mar-
ket-based assistance levels also potentially im-
pacts the United States’ WTO commitments. Our 
analysis finds that it is unlikely that ACRE would 
cause the United States to exceed its current WTO
commitment, although the possibility cannot be 
ruled out in a high payment year. However, 
should the 2008 proposed draft of the Doha 
Round negotiations be adopted, it is more likely 
that the ACRE state revenue program would make 
payments large enough to exceed new product-
specific caps and other U.S. commitments, as-
suming that participation in ACRE is sufficiently 
large and given projected levels of acres, prices, 
and yields. Whatever the WTO situation that the 
United States faces, ACRE’s design raises an im-
portant question about the distortion of market 
incentives and international trade by policy: Is the 
economic dislocation over a longer time horizon 
caused by a policy that establishes a floor more or 
less than the economic dislocation caused by a 
policy whose level of support is determined by 
the market and thus has no floor? While this 
question has received little attention, the answer 
to it within the context of the market conditions 
that will prevail in future years has significant 
implications both for the design of domestic pol-
icy instruments as well as for the development of 
compliance rules within WTO.
  Both the current rules of the Uruguay Round 
and the potential rules of the Doha Round will 
continue to allow expenditures on programs that 
are tied to current production and/or prices. It 
thus behooves policymakers to create policy 
instruments that provide the best mix of policy 
performance attributes. The ACRE revenue pro-
gram is in essence asking what policy perform-
ance attributes are desired given the market con-
ditions that exist in the early twenty-first century. 
The answers are not obvious but provide a rich 
opportunity for economists to contribute to this 
debate, ranging from more robust estimates of 
core economic parameters, such as intertemporal 
and spatial price and revenue correlations, to em-
pirical assessments of alternative policy designs 
as conducted herein, to further assessments of the 
political economy of farm policy options, to the 
development of new theoretical constructs with 
which to frame the economic and policy discus-
sion. 
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